willful obstruction of law enforcement officers

69, 663 S.E.2d 411 (2008). 16-10-24 was justified. denied, 543 U.S. 988, 125 S. Ct. 507, 160 L. Ed. Summary judgment based on qualified immunity was properly denied in a 42 U.S.C. 74, 625 S.E.2d 485 (2005). Conviction of obstruction of a law enforcement officer, O.C.G.A. 772, 703 S.E.2d 140 (2010). For article on the 2017 amendment of this Code section, see 34 Ga. St. U.L. Mayfield v. State, 276 Ga. App. June 22, 2007)(Unpublished). 852, 350 S.E.2d 835 (1986); Robinson v. State, 182 Ga. App. Pearson v. State, 224 Ga. App. 16-10-24(a) during an undercover drug sting, the defendant possessed crack cocaine and marijuana, the defendant violated the technical terms of the defendant's supervised release by failing to report to the defendant's probation officer, and the defendant associated with a known felon. 493, 677 S.E.2d 680 (2009). - Whether actions hinder or impede officers in carrying out assigned duties is for jury determination. 384, 801 S.E.2d 82 (2017); State v. Brienza, 350 Ga. App. Gordon v. State, 337 Ga. App. 83, 473 S.E.2d 245 (1996); Cunningham v. State, 222 Ga. App. - After an arrestee followed an officer to the police car after a traffic stop, leaned over the hood with a pen in hand ready to write the officer's name down, and was arrested, the wrongful arrest claim survived summary judgment because the officer lacked arguable probable cause to arrest the arrestee for misdemeanor obstruction under O.C.G.A. Where defendant fit the description given for a fleeing suspect, was seen walking in the same direction as the suspect, and was found only minutes after the police "lookout" call regarding the fleeing suspect was sent, defendant's brief seizure by a police officer for questioning was warranted; thus, contrary to defendant's contention challenging the denial of defendant's motion for a directed verdict, the officer was lawfully discharging the officer's official duties during that brief seizure when defendant struck the officer, and the evidence was sufficient to allow a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty of obstruction of a law enforcement officer under O.C.G.A. 606, 462 S.E.2d 630 (1995); Strickland v. State, 221 Ga. App. Evidence that the defendant repeatedly disobeyed the officer's lawful directive to remain in the car for the officer's safety, that the defendant jumped out of the car and confronted the officer, and that the defendant resisted the officer's attempts to physically place the defendant in the car was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for obstruction of an officer as the evidence showed the defendant knowingly obstructed the officer in the officer's lawful discharge of the officer's duties. 39, 443 S.E.2d 869 (1994); Norman v. State, 214 Ga. App. - Because the defendant could commit felony obstruction only if the defendant offered violence against an officer while the officer was in the lawful discharge of the officer's official duties and felony obstruction could occur regardless of whether it involved the use of an offensive weapon likely to result in serious bodily injury, unlike aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. Haygood v. State, 338 Ga. App. Evans v. State, 290 Ga. App. 12, 739 S.E.2d 32 (2013). Pugh v. State, 280 Ga. App. Cooper v. State, 350 Ga. App. 16-10-24. Coroner Kenny Cooper: 'After all we've been through, we're still alive'. Construction with O.C.G.A. Obstruction of justice is a fact-based offense under Georgia law. - Former Code 1933, 26-2505 (see now O.C.G.A. Cobble v. State, 297 Ga. App. Injury to the officer is not an element of felony obstruction of an officer. Bates v. Harvey, 518 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir. 308, 398 S.E.2d 292 (1990), overruled on other grounds, Duke v. State, 205 Ga. App. 688, 505 S.E.2d 774 (1998); Johnson v. State, 234 Ga. App. Recent arrests around the county. Coroner Kenny 16-10-24(b) conviction for felony obstruction of a police officer after the officer tried to arrest the defendant on an outstanding warrant and after the officer was identified and ordered defendant to stop, the defendant struck and kicked the police officer as the defendant attempted to flee. Carlos Jermaine Evans Possession of Firearm by Convicted Felon, Obstruction of Law Enforcement Officer. Because direct eyewitness testimony from three eyewitnesses supported a finding that defendant struck a correctional officer while that officer was attempting to handcuff defendant, this evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction of felony obstruction of an officer. 456, 571 S.E.2d 456 (2002). Maintenance of records by Georgia Crime Information Center regarding violations of O.C.G.A. The defendant resisted when officers tried to put handcuffs on the defendant and the officers were forced to wrestle the defendant to the ground before the officers could handcuff the defendant. 2d 373 (2004). Evidence supported defendant's obstruction of a law enforcement officer conviction because the officers were acting within the lawful discharge of their duties in arresting defendant for theft under either O.C.G.A. 482, 669 S.E.2d 477 (2008). 16-10-24 because the evidence authorized the jury to find that the defendant had obstructed or hindered two officers; there was evidence that although the defendant had been informed of the purpose of the encounter, the defendant persisted in refusing to provide a driver's license, assumed a physically aggressive stance, and refused to comply with commands to stop fighting or resisting, and there also was evidence that after being informed that the defendant was under arrest for obstruction, the defendant physically resisted the arrest. 579, 669 S.E.2d 530 (2008). When officers arrested a defendant after responding to a report that a person resembling the subject of a "be on the lookout for" (BOLO) flyer had been in a bank, suppression was not warranted because when the defendant actively struggled with the officers, the officers acquired probable cause to arrest the defendant for obstruction under O.C.G.A. 798, 665 S.E.2d 896 (2008). Evidence was sufficient for the jury to find defendant guilty of obstructing a police officer, in violation of O.C.G.A. Yet cases against police officers can be difficult. 493, 333 S.E.2d 691 (1985). WebIf you are convicted, you will face one to five years in prison. 668, 344 S.E.2d 490 (1986). S07C1576, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 667 (Ga. 2007). Robinson v. State, 288 Ga. App. - Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's O.C.G.A. 16-11-39, based on the defendant's yelling obscenities at the officer. 520, 600 S.E.2d 637 (2004). 209, 294 S.E.2d 305 (1982). Webwith Intent, Obstruction of Law Enforcement Officer Eric Heath Mims VOP (Agg. 511 (2006). 73 (2017). 40, 692 S.E.2d 708 (2010). 1976); Smith v. State, 144 Ga. App. - Accusation charging defendant with "knowingly and wilfully [obstructing] officer in the lawful discharge of his official duties as a law enforcement officer in violation of [this section]" sufficiently apprised the defendant of the acts of which defendant was accused. 374, 226 S.E.2d 471 (1976). Jenkins v. State, 310 Ga. App. 689, 423 S.E.2d 427 (1992); Hardwick v. State, 210 Ga. App. Although the evidence that the probationer made the probationer's arrest warrant unavailable to the officers was circumstantial, the evidence was sufficient to authorize the trial court's finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the probationer obstructed the officers. 1983 case where a claim of unlawful arrest and a properly subsumed excessive force claim as to Fourth Amendment violations were sufficiently alleged; there were disputed issues as to whether a deputy and others engaged in a lawful discharge of official duties when they arrested the claimant pursuant to O.C.G.A. Gille v. State, 351 Ga. App. - Because misdemeanor obstruction was a lesser included offense of felony obstruction, the defendant's convictions for felony and misdemeanor obstruction should have been merged; therefore, the defendant's sentence was void. 24-6-609) because the violation was a felony punishable by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than five years. 16-10-24(a), because defendant impeded the officer in the discharge of the officer's duties, and the defendant hindered the officer not just by the defendant's arguments and obstinacy, but also by placing both defendant's and the officer's safety at risk by refusing to return to defendant's vehicle during a traffic stop. 774, 525 S.E.2d 154 (1999), overruled on other grounds by McClure v. State, 306 Ga. 856, 834 S.E.2d 96 (2019). Felony obstruction conviction was reversed since there was no evidence that defendant's verbal threats made against the arresting officer obstructed completion of the officer's duties, the threats were made while defendant was already in custody and cooperating with the officer, and concerned future acts of violence, and not imminent acts that if carried out would have prevented the officer from completing the arrest. 223, 679 S.E.2d 790 (2009). Arnold v. State, 249 Ga. App. Sharp v. State, 275 Ga. App. 600, 677 S.E.2d 758 (2009). 1915A dismissal of the inmate's claims for false arrest and false imprisonment as barred by the Heck decision, the district court's dismissal was premature since the inmate had not been convicted of violating O.C.G.A. State v. 256, 439 S.E.2d 510 (1993); Okongwu v. State, 220 Ga. App. 45, 749 S.E.2d 45 (2013). WebArticle 2 - OBSTRUCTION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND RELATED OFFENSES 16-10-24 - Obstructing or hindering law enforcement officers. 357, 529 S.E.2d 644 (2000). Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's conviction for obstructing an officer based on the evidence that showed that the defendant failed to follow the officer's instructions in that the defendant refused to exit the truck when told to do so; the defendant locked the door, rolled up the window and indicated calling9-1-1; and, after the officers pulled the defendant out of the truck, the defendant struggled with the officers, refused to be handcuffed, and tried to get up from the ground. 16-10-24(a), was proper because the evidence showed that the defendant shoved a deputy and failed to obey orders made by the deputy in efforts to assist an animal control officer capture the defendant's dogs, who did not have their required rabies tags; it was unnecessary for the state to prove the underlying offense that caused the officers to act. Because: (1) the trial court did not err in admitting certain identification evidence alleged to be hearsay, as testimony relative to the identification was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted; (2) the defendant's requested instruction was not tailored to the facts and was potentially confusing; and (3) the defendant's character was not placed in issue, convictions of armed robbery, hijacking a motor vehicle, and obstruction were all upheld. 66, 653 S.E.2d 358 (2007). Cole v. State, 273 Ga. App. 16-10-24(b), qualified as a violent felony. - Acquittal on simple battery charge showed that jury was not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant intentionally made physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with deputy or that appellant physically harmed the deputy intentionally, but did not show that the jury necessarily found that appellant did not obstruct or hinder the deputy in performing official duty. 16-10-24(b). 412, 767 S.E.2d 771 (2014). - In a parent's tort action arising from an accusation by store employees that the parent's child stole from the store, the trial court properly refused to strike evidence of an employee's conviction for violating O.C.G.A. 381, 593 S.E.2d 919 (2004). 26, 303 S.E.2d 170 (1983); Pugh v. State, 173 Ga. App. Upon a second conviction for a violation of this subsection, such person shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than two years nor more than ten years. 751, 270 S.E.2d 38 (1980); Jenga v. State, 166 Ga. App. Because defendant swung at a police officer's face with a loose handcuff and violently struggled during an attempted arrest, the evidence was sufficient to sustain a felony obstruction conviction under O.C.G.A. Tuggle v. State, 236 Ga. App. 875, 833 S.E.2d 573 (2019). State v. Fisher, 293 Ga. App. Spencer v. State, 296 Ga. App. 802, 644 S.E.2d 898 (2007). 204, 410 S.E.2d 799 (1991); Hall v. State, 201 Ga. App. 209, 422 S.E.2d 15, cert. Jamaarques Omaurion Cripps Terroristic Threats and Acts. ), cert. McMullen v. State, 325 Ga. App. 16-10-24(a), as defense counsel conceded at trial that the officer's arrest was "legitimate," and no action was taken to suggest otherwise. - Defendant's convictions and sentence for terroristic threats and obstruction of an officer did not violate the constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy and cruel and unusual punishment. Miller v. State, 351 Ga. App. Sign up for our free summaries and get the latest delivered directly to you. When an officer asked the defendant, who was on a bicycle and had been looking into parked cars, what the defendant was doing, the defendant yelled obscenities at the officer and pedaled away; the defendant did not comply with the officer's command to come back so the officer could check the defendant's identification. 3583(e)(3) after revoking defendant's supervised release term because the defendant was arrested for the misdemeanor of obstruction of officers under O.C.G.A. 218, 507 S.E.2d 13 (1998); Pinchon v. State, 237 Ga. App. S92C1446, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 865 (1992). Beckom v. State, 286 Ga. App. 493, 677 S.E.2d 680 (2009). The charge as a whole adequately covered the principle of law and allowed the defendant to argue that the defendant should have been acquitted because the state proved only disagreement or remonstrance. 16-10-24(a), was not supported by sufficient evidence under circumstances in which a deputy investigating an armed robbery stopped the defendant's car, but then chased the defendant's passenger who had exited the car and fled, and the defendant then drove away from the scene; although the defendant drove away after being stopped, the encounter with the deputy apparently had ended and the defendant had not been instructed to remain on the scene. Defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal was properly denied as the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of two misdemeanor counts of obstructing a law enforcement officer because there was ample testimony about the existence and purpose of the order pursuant to which they assisted the deputies in taking the defendant into custody for transport to a mental health facility; the defendant refused to comply with the officers' verbal commands, and began fighting with the officers when the officers tried to detain the defendant; the defendant hit, kicked, and scratched the officers; and the officers and the defendant fell to the ground, and the defendant continued fighting until the officers were able to gain control of the defendant. 85, 498 S.E.2d 531 (1998). 16-7-1(a) and16-10-24(a). 153, 676 S.E.2d 821 (2009). - Juvenile's adjudications on the charges of loitering and obstruction of an officer arising out of the July 18 incident were reversed for failure to prove venue because, although the officer testified that the officer observed two individuals loitering outside the apartment complex, the officer never testified that the complex was in Spalding County or that the officer's pursuit of the juvenile occurred there; the state presented no other evidence of venue, and nothing in the record indicated that the trial court took judicial notice of the location of the apartment complex; and defense counsel's statements were not intended to be a stipulation of venue or that the juvenile authorized a stipulation as to venue. - Defendant was properly sentenced as an armed career criminal because the defendant's 1998 Georgia felony conviction for obstructing or hindering a law enforcement officer was a violent felony and the defendant's 1998 Georgia felony conviction for possessing marijuana with the intent to distribute fell squarely within the Armed Career Criminal Act's definition of a serious drug offense. Defendant's failure to respond immediately to a police officer's orders was insufficient to sustain a conviction for obstruction of a law enforcement officer, even though defendant did not verbally or physically threaten the officer and, in fact, did not speak to, or argue with the officer. 16-10-24(a) in that defendant knowingly and willfully obstructed or hindered the officer in the lawful discharge of the officer's duties by refusing to follow the officer's reasonable and lawful commands, the offenses as charged in the case were not mutually exclusive as the offenses had different elements and neither guilty verdict legally or logically excluded the other. Given the evidence provided by law enforcement that: (1) the defendant hindered and obstructed one officer in the lawful discharge of that officer's duties while the officer went to check on the welfare of the defendant's wife; (2) the defendant's act of resisting the other officer while that officer was arresting the defendant; and (3) the defendant's act of breaking off the interior door handle of the patrol vehicle and forcing the vehicle's window off the window's frame, the defendant's convictions for both felony and misdemeanor obstruction of an officer and a felony count of interfering with government property were upheld on appeal. - Because the defendant decided to pursue an "all or nothing" defense, the trial court did not err in making the decision to not charge the jury on misdemeanor obstruction, sua sponte, as such would have undermined that defense. 757, 754 S.E.2d 798 (2014). - Defendant's conviction of obstruction of a law enforcement officer, O.C.G.A. Officers were lawfully discharging their official duties, despite their unlawful presence in the home with respect to the homeowner, because they had probable cause and a warrant to arrest defendant and defendant had no standing to object to the search of the house. 2007). Daniel v. State, 282 Ga. App. On a summary judgment motion, under 42 U.S.C. Sept. 2, 2014)(Unpublished). - Federal district court did not abuse the court's discretion by imposing the highest possible sentence permitted by 18 U.S.C. 835, 652 S.E.2d 870 (2007). Carlos Jermaine Evans Possession of Firearm by Convicted Felon, Obstruction of Law Enforcement Officer. The 2017 amendment, effective July 1, 2017, substituted the present provisions of subsection (a) for the former provisions, which read: "Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this Code section, a person who knowingly and willfully obstructs or hinders any law enforcement officer in the lawful discharge of his official duties is guilty of a misdemeanor. 178, 369 S.E.2d 798 (1988); Patterson v. State, 191 Ga. App. 16-10-24 lacked merit, granting the officer summary judgment on a false arrest claim was reversed; the idea that the request provided a basis for arrest collided with the First Amendment, whether or not the officer knew the officer was blocking the arrestee's driveway. - Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction of misdemeanor obstruction of a law enforcement officer because, when officers came to defendant's home to execute an arrest warrant on a third party, defendant tried to shut the door, but officers pushed the door open, forcing defendant into the front room, where defendant yelled at the officers, stood face-to-face with one officer while yelling, pointed a finger in the face of another officer, and defendant also blocked a hallway, forcing officers to move defendant to the side so that they could search the rest of the home and defendant was told several times to sit down and remain in one place, but was uncooperative. 689, 423 S.E.2d 427 (1992). The evidence established only that the officer asked the defendant to come over here to talk to the officer, which was not a command. 682, 523 S.E.2d 610 (1999). Because the testimony from the deputy named in the challenged count charging the defendant with felony obstruction testified that the defendant was making a scene, hollering, cussing, carrying on, kicking, screaming, resisting arrest, pulling away, and attempting to kick someone in the crowd, which was confirmed by the testimony of a second deputy, sufficient evidence was presented to support the felony obstruction charge. Fricks v. State, 210 Ga. App. Duncan v. State, 163 Ga. App. Cooper v. State, 270 Ga. App. 843.05. On a charge of misdemeanor obstruction of an officer, the evidence that the defendant knew that the defendant was dealing with law enforcement officers was sufficient. Because sufficient evidence was presented that the defendant physically assaulted an off-duty sheriff's officer prior to arrest and continued to resist and obstruct the officer's official duties thereafter, the defendant was properly denied an acquittal and a new trial; moreover, given that the trial court properly charged the jury on the obstruction offense, explaining that a person committed the offense by knowingly and willfully obstructing or hindering a law enforcement officer in the lawful discharge of that officer's official duties, nothing beyond such was required. An officer's testimony that a juvenile defendant assumed a "fighting stance," placed the defendant's fists in front of the defendant's face, and yelled obscenities at officers while refusing to obey the officers' commands was sufficient to show that the defendant "offered to do violence" to the officers under O.C.G.A. - Defendant officer was not entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim because the officer had no arguable probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for misdemeanor obstruction under O.C.G.A. Rev. 16-10-24). - Evidence that defendant purposefully kicked and attempted to bite officers as they were assisting in the investigation of a shooting was sufficient to support a conviction. 16-10-24(a) because an investigator had ample specific and articulable facts to justify stopping the defendant, and the circumstances were sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct; minutes after having heard a lookout bulletin, the investigator arrived at the scene to discover a person there matching the description provided in the lookout bulletin, including having a red bag in the person's possession, the victim pointed to the person as the perpetrator, and gathered onlookers were shouting as the onlookers pointed the investigator to the defendant. To support the defendant 's yelling obscenities at the officer ( 1990 ), on! - evidence was sufficient to support the defendant 's O.C.G.A ) because the violation was a felony punishable imprisonment. 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